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Exploiting Contextual Information in Atacking
Set-Generalized Transactions
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Transactions are records that contain a set of items about individuals. For example, items browsed by a cus-
tomer when shopping online form a transaction. Today, many activities are carried out on the Internet, result-
ing in a large amount of transaction data being collected. Such data are often shared and analyzed to improve
business and services, but they also contain private information about individuals that must be protected.
Techniques have been proposed to sanitize transaction data before their release, and set-based generalization
is one such method. In this article, we study how well set-based generalization can protect transactions. We
propose methods to attack set-generalized transactions by exploiting contextual information that is available
within the released data. Our results show that set-based generalization may not provide adequate protection
for transactions, and up to 70% of the items added into the transactions during generalization to obfuscate
original data can be detected by our methods with a precision over 80%.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Transactions are records that contain a set of items about individuals, and they are being increas-
ingly collected, shared, and analyzed as a result of increased activities on the Internet and wide-
spread deployment of data-capturing applications. For example, when patients visit a hospital,
their diagnostic data may be recorded and then used in medical studies, and when customers shop
online, their browsing activities may be retained by the vendor to help recommend products to
other customers. Such data are valuable to the society and organizations, as their analysis can help
improve business intelligence and healthcare provision.
However, transaction datamay contain personal and sensitive information, and publishing them
directly can risk privacy breaches (Golle 2006; Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008). Unfortunately,
de-identiication (i.e., removing personal identiiers) may not provide suicient protection for in-
dividuals’ privacy (Barbaro and Zeller 2006). For example, Figure 1 shows a set of four transactions,
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Fig. 1. An example of transaction data.
Fig. 2. Set-generalized transactions.
each recording somemedical conditions associatedwith a patient. If an adversary knows thatMary
has a blood pressure condition and she is in the dataset, then he or she can infer that transaction 1
belongs to Mary and ind out other information about her.
To protect transactions against potential privacy disclosure, techniques have been developed
to anonymize them. One such technique is set-based generalization, which attempts to hide an
original item by replacing it with a set of items. For example, Figure 2 is a set-generalized version
of Figure 1 where blood pressure, for instance, is generalized to (blood pressure, icd, limbs, injury).
As such, knowing that Mary has a blood pressure condition will no longer be enough to link Mary
to transaction 1 with certainty.
It has been shown that set-based generalization is more lexible and can retain data utility better
than other generalization methods (Loukides et al. 2013). Data publishers can specify which items
to protect (e.g., blood pressure and icd in Figure 2) and to what extent (e.g., having at least four
transactions to cover them). However, set-based generalization does not consider the transaction
as a whole when forming a set to generalize an item. This makes it vulnerable to attacks that use
other items in the transaction as a context. For example, consider the generalized transaction 4 in
Figure 2. Although it suggests that blood pressure, icd, limbs, injury or any combination of them are
possible, the presence of knee hints that it is more likely to be injury than icd. This type of semantic
analysis will allow an adversary to reduce a generalized item to its original form, thereby breaking
the protection for the data.
The irst attempt to reconstruct original transactions from their set-generalized versions
through semantic analysis was reported in Ong and Shao (2014). Their methods use Normalized
Google Distance (NGD) (Cilibrasi and Vitányi 2007) to score semantic relationships between items
and eliminate any item in a generalized item (e.g., blood pressure) that is deemed to have a weak
relationship with a contextual item (e.g., knee) based on their NGD score. However, these methods
are threshold based and can lead to wrong eliminations when a rare item occurs in a transaction.
This is because a rare item tends to have a higher NGD than a more common item does when
assessing their semantic relationships with another item, even if the rare item is more strongly
related to the given item than the more common one is.
In this article, we address this issue. We propose new methods to attack set-generalized trans-
actions. More speciically, we make the following contributions:
—Similarly to the methods proposed in Ong and Shao (2014), we build our new methods on
NGD. This measure establishes a semantic relationship between two terms by querying
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the Google repository of WWW pages: The more pages in which the two terms appear
together, the more related they are considered to be. This allows both term co-occurrence
and semantic similarity to be measured, as we shall explain later, and eliminates the need to
construct a comprehensive dictionary or a corpus for testing item relationships. This makes
our approach generic and practical.
—We propose two clustering-based methods that aim to identify comparable NGD distances
irst and then apply heuristics to eliminate items from a cluster that is deemed to be more
likely to contain an item that is not original but is added to a transaction during generaliza-
tion. This is in contrast to the methods proposed in Ong and Shao (2014) that treat all NGD
scores uniformly.
Our experiments show that set-based generalization may not provide adequate protection for
transaction data, and up to 70% of the items added to transactions during generalization can be
detected by our methods with a precision over 80%. Note that, in contrast to other studies on
quantifying privacy risk involved in publishing transaction data, where adversaries are assumed
to either attack de-identiied (not generalized) transactions (Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008; Datta
et al. 2012) or have some auxiliary information to help recover original data (Giannella et al. 2013),
our methods attack anonymized data without using or assuming any background knowledge (e.g.,
knowingm items about an individual (Terrovitis et al. 2008) or certain association between data
items (Martin et al. 2007)) and uses only the information available from the released data. This is
signiicant, as it represents a realistic assessment of privacy risk associated with set-based gener-
alization.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work. In Section 3,
we introduce our semantic attack, which consists of two main components: Scoring and Elimina-
tion. We describe the scoring component in Section 4 and focus on the elimination component in
Section 5. Section 6 reports experimental results, and Section 7 concludes the article.
2 RELATEDWORK
Earlier work on assessing privacy risk associatedwith data publishing focused on data distribution.
For example, link attack (Sweeney 2002) attempts to identify an individual from a dataset by using
combinations of certain attribute values (called quasi-identiiers) that do not appear frequently
enough; homogeneity attack (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007) aims to reveal sensitive information
associated with individuals by considering data distribution within an equivalence group with-
out needing to identify the individuals irst; and probabilistic attack (Li et al. 2007) compares data
distribution before and after data sanitization, thereby disclosing sensitive information about in-
dividuals if probabilities of estimating sensitive information for individuals change signiicantly
after data sanitization. These attacks are syntactic and they do not consider data semantics as we
do in this article.
Later studies considered more advanced attacks using background information beyond the dis-
tribution of data. For example, minimality attack (Wong et al. 2007) exploits the fact that data
sanitization methods typically seek to minimize data distortion during sanitization, and uses this
knowledge to identify how original data may be altered to satisfy some minimal protection re-
quirements. Xiao et al. (2010) proposed transparency attack, which assumes that the adversary
knows the algorithm used to sanitize the data and uses this knowledge to recover original data.
Martin et al. (2007) considered attacks where an adversary has some knowledge about individu-
als that is not represented in the data, and they capture this knowledge as implications between
non-sensitive and sensitive data items and use them when attacking sanitized data. In contrast,
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our methods do not assume any background knowledge and assess privacy risk using published
data only.
There are works that do not directly attempt to identify individuals or the sensitive information
associated with them from published datasets but consider how original data may be recovered
from sanitized ones. For example, when a set of data is transformed to protect privacy but also
retains Euclidean distances, one may attempt to break the transformation and recover the original
values by using a few known data points in the dataset (Giannella et al. 2013). Narayanan and
Shmatikov proposed a method for attacking de-identiied transactions (Narayanan and Shmatikov
2008) by using a few known items about an individual to determine other items associated with the
individual through some similarity and ranking calculations. Our work shares with these methods
in principle: We also attempt to use the published data to break the cover. However, our approach
difers from theirs in that we rely on semantic relationships that exist within the dataset rather
than assuming certain data properties, such as Euclidean distances, sparsity of data, or known data
points.
More recently, Sánchez et al. considered the efect of semantic relationships among data items
when sanitizing them (Sánchez et al. 2013). Their method deals with text data speciically and
measures the semantic relationship between two terms. Similarly to our work, they also adopt
NGD to detect related terms. However, they attempt to establish whether the items remaining in
a text after sanitization could be used to recover those that have been suppressed during saniti-
zation. In contrast, our work targets transaction data and uses items as contextual information
to assess if items added by set-based generalization may be removed. Ong and Shao (2014) pro-
posed de-anonymization methods to reconstruct original transactions from set-generalized ver-
sions through semantic analysis, and the diference between their methods and those proposed
here has already been analyzed in the Introduction.
3 SEMANTIC ATTACK EXPLOITING CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
In this section, we introduce our approach to attacking set-generalized transactions. We irst
present some notations and concepts necessary to understanding our approach, then give an
overview of our approach.
3.1 Preliminaries
Let I = {i1, . . . , im } be a inite set of literals called items. A transaction T over I is a set of items
T = 〈a1,a2, . . . ,ak 〉, where each aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k , is a distinct item in I. A transaction dataset D =
{T1, . . . ,Tn } is a set of transactions over I.
Deinition 3.1 (Itemset and Support). Any subset I ⊆ I is called an itemset. An itemset I is sup-
ported by transaction T if I ⊆ T . We use σD (I ) to represent the number of transactions in D that
support I .
For example, 〈дanдrene, limbs, injury〉 is a transaction in Figure 1. 〈limbs, injury〉 is an itemset
and is supported by T3, that is, σD (〈limbs, injury〉) = 1. When the support for an itemset is low,
an attacker may use it to identify an individual with a high probability. To address this, various
privacy models have been proposed (Terrovitis et al. 2008; Loukides et al. 2011). For the purpose
of this article, we use a simple, but commonly adopted, privacy model based on support count.
Deinition 3.2 (Transaction Protection). Let D = {T1,T2, . . . ,Tn } be a set of transactions, and p =
(I ,σmin ) be a privacy constraint that requires an itemset I to have a minimum support σmin inD.
D is protected w.r.t. p if either σD (I ) ≥ σmin or σD (I ) = 0.
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When speciied privacy constraints are not satisied, data must be sanitized. One approach is
set-based generalization, which replaces individual items by a set of items (Loukides et al. 2011).
Deinition 3.3 (Set-Based Generalization). A set-based generalization is a partition I˜ of I in
which each item i ∈ I is replaced by the partition to which it belongs. Each partition is called a
generalized item. When an item is generalized to itself, we say that the item is trivially generalized.
We denote a generalized item by listing its items in brackets, for example, (blood pressure, icd,
limbs, injury) in Figure 2, and we interpret it as representing any non-empty subset of its members,
for example, (blood pressure, icd, limbs, injury) may represent blood pressure, icd , limbs, injury or
any combination of them. We call an item in a generalized item original item if it is in the original
transaction and an added item if it is added to the transaction during generalization. For example,
in T4 of Figure 2, injury in (blood pressure, icd, limbs, injury) is an original item and limbs is an
added item.
3.2 Semantic Atack
Given a set of set-generalized transactions, we are interested to see if any added items may be
identiied from a generalized item by considering the semantic relationships that exist among the
items.
Deinition 3.4 (Context). Given a generalized transaction T˜ ,C is a context of T˜ ifC contains only
trivially generalized items in T˜ . We call an item in C a contextual item.
Deinition 3.5 (Semantic Relationship). Let C be a context of T˜ , i˜ be a generalised item in T˜ , and
iˆ be an item in i˜ . Semantic relationship between iˆ and C , denoted by s (C, iˆ ), is a measure of their
expected co-occurrence in T˜ .
When iˆ is deemed unlikely to occur in T˜ with C , we may eliminate iˆ from i˜ , thereby break-
ing the generalization. So our semantic attack is based on a form of item co-occurrence analysis,
which is similar in principle to latent semantic analysis (LSA) in document indexing and retrieval
(Deeerwester et al. 1990). Diferent approaches, such as machine learning or ontological analysis
(Nenkova and McKeown 2012), may be used to derive s (C, iˆ ), and in this article, we adopt Normal-
ized Google Distance (NGD) (Cilibrasi and Vitányi 2007):
NGD (x ,y) =
max (loд( f (x )), loд( f (y))) − loд( f (x ,y))
loд(N ) −min(loд( f (x )), loд( f (y)))
, (1)
where f (x ) is the number of Google pages containing x , f (y) the number of pages containing y,
f (x ,y) the number of pages containing both x and y, and N the size of the Google repository. The
smaller the NGD (x ,y), the more closely x and y are deemed to be related. For example, we have
NGD (paracetamol ,HIV ) > NGD (paracetamol , cold ), suggesting that paracetamol is more closely
associated with cold than with HIV.
We adopt NGD in our work for two reasons. First, NGDmeasures semantic relationship between
two items in terms of their co-occurrence in a document rather than based on their ontological
similarity. This is important as the ability to test if two terms can be expected to occur together,
but may not necessarily be related ontologically, can help detect added items in a generalized item,
as our example above shows. Second, NGD uses Google repository for testing term co-occurrence.
The extensive range of topics covered by Google means that term co-occurrence can be tested in
many contexts or domains, without needing a comprehensive corpus like LSA requires. This is
desirable and makes our methods generic and practical.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 17, No. 4, Article 40. Publication date: September 2017.
40:6 J. Shao and H. Ong
3.3 Overview of Our Approach
We observe that when an item in a transaction is generalized, items added to the generalized item
may not always be consistent (or is unlikely to occur) with the contextual items surrounding them.
Our idea is to use contextual items to detect if any item in a generalized item is an added one. We
do so in two steps:
—Scoring is a step to establish the strength of relationships between items in a generalized
item and contextual items using NGD as a measure. Given a transaction, it is reasonable to
expect its items collectively forming some context(s), as the transactions in Figure 1 demon-
strate. Thus, when an item in a generalized transaction displays a weak relationship with
contextual items, we can reasonably suspect that it may be an added item. The scoring step
is to identify such candidates by selecting suitable contexts and deriving NGD scores.
—Elimination is to determine which candidate items are added items, based on the scores
obtained from the scoring step. Note that NGD scores are relative: They indicate if an item
is more likely to be related to one item than another but do not give an absolute verdict on
whether two items are deinitely related or not. Thus, heuristics are needed. In this article,
we develop two such heuristics.
It is worth noting that while we consider semantic attack on set-generalized transactions only in
this article, our approach is applicable to other types of data and sanitisation, too. For example,
when bucketization is used to protect relational data (even with substantial background knowl-
edge taken into account (Martin et al. 2007)), and when privacy-preserving document indexing
(Bawa et al. 2003; Tang et al. 2014; Tang and Liu 2015) is exercised or disassociation is used for
transaction sanitization (Terrovitis et al. 2012), only the frequency of data association is altered and
semantic relationship among the data items remains unchanged. As such, the sanitized data are
still vulnerable to the type of attack we study here. So our approach complements existing privacy
assessment by considering semantic relationship rather than frequency of data association. In the
next two sections, we explain the two steps of our approach in detail.
4 SCORING ITEM RELATIONSHIPS
In this section, we consider how a context may be obtained from a generalized transaction and
how the relationship between the items in a generalized item and the contextual items may be
scored.
4.1 Forming a Context
Given a contextC = {i1, . . . , iw } and a generalized item i˜ = (iˆ1, . . . , iˆh ), there are two possible ways
to interpret the relationship between C and i˜:
—C is considered as a single “conjunctive” item andNGD (C, iˆ j ) is measured. That is, we assess
if an item in i˜ is likely to occur with all the items in C .
—C is considered as containing individual items, and the relationship between an item in i˜ j
and each item in C is measured separately and the scores are averaged:
dC, iˆ j =
∑
c ∈C NGD (c, iˆ j )
|C |
(2)
The irst approach is more likely to lead to inaccurate estimation when C is large and con-
tains multiple “themes.” For example, a transaction extracted from a patient discharge re-
port may contain multiple diseases about the patient, and items in i˜ j may not necessarily
be related to all contextual items. We therefore adopt the second approach.
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Fig. 3. Distance table.
Fig. 4. An example distance table.
Note that in forming a context, we assume that an adversary knows which item is generalized.
This is commonly assumed as making generalization explicit helps enhance data utility. If data are
released without generalized items being explicitly marked, for example, brackets are not used to
mark generalized items in Figure 2, then an additional step is needed to identify contextual items
irst. Further discussion on this is beyond the scope of current article. Furthermore, our technique
assumes that co-occurrence-based semantic relationship among items is meaningful. This may
not be true for some datasets, for example, in a shopping basket dataset where each transaction
records items that a customer has purchased. Such datasets may not have the type of contextual
items that we consider in our work. For example, given 〈milk, (bread, bacon), cheese, medicine〉,
it may be inferred that bread is most likely to be an original item, since it occurs with milk and
cheese more frequently. However, this is unjustiied, as items in this case are related by shopping
preferences rather than by certain context. Our methods are unsuitable to use to attack this type
of transaction data.
4.2 Distance Table
Set-based generalization requires that generalized items form k-equivalence groups. That is, each
generalized item will appear at least k times within the released transactions. This is to ensure that
the probability of using generalized items to link an individual to a transaction is no more than
1/k . We therefore consider the whole equivalence group together when attacking a generalized
item i˜ = (iˆ1, iˆ2, . . . , iˆs ) by performing NGD on each occurrence of i˜ in diferent transactions and
recording the result in a distance table, as shown in Figure 3, where columns are items in the
generalized item, and rows are contextual items from each transaction in the group. Note that
while the generalized item i˜ is identical in every transaction within the equivalence group, the
contextual items that are selected to attack it need not be the same. In fact, as each transaction
difers, contexts are likely to difer, thereby allowing the membership of iˆ in i˜ to be discriminated
in a given transaction.
To illustrate our method, consider Figure 2 again. Applying our scoring function to the general-
ized item (blood pressure, icd, limbs, injury), we obtain the distance table in Figure 4 (we use bold for
distances of original items). This generalized item contains four items and forms a 4-equivalence
group, hence a 4 × 4 distance table. The largest distance is 2.93 between icd and gangrene, suggest-
ing that they are not perhaps as related as others are, and icd is likely to be an item added to T3 by
the generalization process. Note that in this example, we used a single contextual item to attack
the generalized item. In general, any number of contextual items may be used.
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5 ELIMINATING ADDED ITEMS
In our previous work we proposed methods that heuristically eliminate added items based on
their NGD scores (Ong and Shao 2014). These methods treat all NGD scores within a distance
table uniformly. For example, icd and gangrene have the greatest distance in Figure 4, thus icd in
T3 is considered most likely to be an added item. This, however, can lead to wrong eliminations,
as we will explain below. In this article, we propose two clustering-based methods that attempt to
identify groups of “comparable distances” irst and then apply heuristics to eliminate added items
within the groups rather than treating all distances in a distance table uniformly.
5.1 Grouping-Based Atack (GBA)
NGD measures the relatedness of two terms by their co-occurrences in WWW pages. If an item
is not commonly used, then its NGD with any other items will be large, even with those they are
closely related to. For example, distances associated withC3 in Figure 4 are generally greater than
others, because gangrene is less commonly used in WWW pages. This implies that treating all
values in a distance table uniformly will be biased towards eliminating items in a row or column
that contains a rare term. Furthermore, NGD is a relative measure. Given NGD of two pairs of
terms NGD (A,B) = d1 and NGD (C,D) = d2, d1 < d2 does not necessarily mean that A is more
related to B than C is to D. However, if we have NGD (A,C ) = d3 and d1 < d3, then it is more
reliable to consider thatA is more related to B than is toC , because we have a common termA for
comparison. To address these issues, we introduce the concepts of comparable distances and their
vulnerability.
Deinition 5.1 (Comparable Distances). Let d1 = NGD (A1,B1),d2 = NGD (A2,B2), . . . ,dm =
(Am ,Bm ) be a set of NGD distances. d1,d2, . . . ,dm are comparable if
⋂m
i=1 ({Ai ∪ Bi })  ∅, where
Ai and Bi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are sets of items.
Comparable distances are those that involve at least one common item in their NGD assess-
ment, so they are more reliable for comparison. For example, the irst column of Figure 4 forms a
group of comparable distances, as they all involve blood pressure in their NGD assessment, and as
such NGD (дanдrene,blood pressure ) = 2.60 and NGD (heart disease,blood pressure ) = 0.56 are
comparable, whereas NGD (дanдrene,blood pressure ) = 2.60 and NGD (knee, injury) = 1.03 are
not.
Deinition 5.2 (Vulnerability). Given a group of comparable distances C = {d1,d2, . . . ,dk } such
that d1 ≤ d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dk , its vulnerability is given by
VC =max (d2 − d1,d3 − d2, . . . ,dk − dk−1). (3)
Vulnerability of a group of comparable distances is the largest distance gap between two neigh-
bouring items. This gap efectively separates the distances within the group into two clusters, one
containing lower distances and the other higher. A larger gap between the two clusters suggests
that items related and not-related to contextual items within the group are better separated. The
higher the vulnerability of a group, the more likely the higher cluster of the group will contain
an added item, and attacking such a group irst is more likely to lead to correct eliminations. For
example, the vulnerabilities of the second row and third row in Figure 4 are 0.95 and 0.82, respec-
tively, suggesting that the second row is more likely to contain an added item even though the
distances in the third row are greater. Thus, vulnerability allows distances to be compared more
meaningfully across groups, especially when rare terms are present.
GBA is based on comparable distances. It treats each row or column of a distance table as a group
of comparable distances and attacks the groups based on their vulnerability. Like our previous
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methods (Ong and Shao 2014), GBA is an iterative method and the distances are weighted to relect
how likely an item is original. GBAwill eliminate one item from the most vulnerable group in each
iteration and then update the weighted distances as follows:
Deinition 5.3 (Weighted Distance). LetD be a distance table and αi j be the distance value at row
i and column j in D. The weighted distance αwij for αi j is
αwij = αi j ×
(
1 −
1
Nr − E
i
r
)
×
(
1 −
1
Nc − E
j
c
)
,
where Nr and Nc are the number of rows and columns in D, and E
i
r and E
j
c are the number of
eliminated items in row i and column j, respectively.
So if a row (or column) containsm items, then each item is initially assumed to have a probability
of 1/m to be an original one. As items are eliminated from the distance table, these probabilities
will change and we use these probabilities as weights to revise the distances recorded in the table
according to Deinition 5.3. Details of GBA are given in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: GBA (D,N r ,N c )
Input: A distance table D with N r rows and N c columns
Output: D with added items eliminated
1: Ec ,Er ← initialise ()
2: Dw ← weiдhtinд(D,N r ,N c ,Er ,Ec )
3: δ ← 1N r+N c
∑
D∈Dw V (D)
4: vk ←maxDk ∈DwV (Dk ) if di j =max (Dk ),N
r − Eri ≥ 2, N
c − Ecj ≥ 2
5: while vk > δ do
6: D← eliminate (D,di j )
7: Eri ← E
r
i + 1, E
c
j ← E
c
j + 1
8: Dw ← weiдhtinд(D,N r ,N c ,Er ,Ec )
9: vk ←maxDk ∈DwV (Dk ) if di j =max (Dk ),N
r − Eri ≥ 2, N
c − Ecj ≥ 2
10: end while
11: return D
Step 1 initializes Er and Ec , which are used to keep tracking the number of eliminations in each
row and column, respectively. This helps update theweighted distance tablemore eiciently. Step 2
calculates the initial weighted distance table, and a vulnerability threshold δ is calculated based on
the initial Dw in Step 3, which is the average vulnerability of all groups of comparable distances
within the table. Note that this average is not re-calculated during iterations as the threshold cal-
culated from all distances is more meaningful and reliable to use. Step 4 selects the group with the
greatest vulnerability according to Deinition 5.2, as long as the group satisies the following con-
dition: The item with the largest value (di j ) in this group is not the last item in the corresponding
row or column. The attacking criteria is checked in Step 5 to see if the vulnerability of the group
is above the threshold. If it is, then di j is removed from the distance table in Step 6. Ec and Er are
then updated, and Dw and vk are re-calculated based on the new D in Steps 8 and 9. The process
terminates when the attacking criteria is no longer satisied and the result is returned in Step 11.
Applying GBA to the distance table in Figure 4 gives the results in Figure 5 after the irst iter-
ation, where the group for column icd is selected, because it has the highest vulnerability of 0.80
and is above the threshold of 0.45, and icd is eliminated from T3. Following the elimination, the
weight table is updated as shown in Figure 5(a).
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Fig. 5. The first iteration of GBA.
Fig. 6. The fith (final) iteration of GBA.
It is worthwhile to observe the calculation of group vulnerability and its efect on the elimi-
nation process at this point. First, group vulnerability is re-calculated after each iteration, and it
may go up or down following an elimination. However, as each iteration involves a diferent set
of distances with diferent weights applied, group vulnerabilities should not be compared across
diferent iterations, as such comparisons are not meaningful. Second, eliminating one item from
one group will afect not only the vulnerability of this group but also the vulnerabilities of other
groups. For example, when icd is eliminated from T3 (third row) in Figure 5, all the distances in the
icd column are afected through weight distribution. This in turn can change, for instance, the vul-
nerability of T1 (irst row). As such, group vulnerability helps target items to eliminate iteratively,
albeit in a greedy fashion.
Continuing the process, at the ifth iteration (Figure 6), the highest vulnerability is 0.41 (with
the blood pressure column) < the threshold, so the process terminates.
As we will show in Section 6, GBA can identify more added items than our previous methods
do. Also it is less afected by the ratio of the number of original items present in generalized items.
Therefore, GBA can be expected to have a better tradeof between the precision of elimination and
the number of added items that can be identiied than do our previous methods.
5.2 Redistribution-Based Atack (RBA)
With GBA, once an item is eliminated, we consider the efect of elimination on the rest of the
items within the group to be equal. That is, we redistribute the weight of the eliminated item to
the rest of the items equally. This makes all these items equally more likely to be an original item.
This, however, can lead to wrong eliminations, as illustrated in Figure 7. When the weight of an
eliminated item is redistributed to all items in the group, it causes all the distances to be reduced.
This in turn causes (a) the gap between the lower and higher clusters to be reduced and (b) shifts
the distances in the higher cluster towards themean, as Figure 7(a) illustrates. As the threshold (the
mean) calculated at the start of the process is ixed, this makes the remaining added items harder
to detect as the iteration progresses. On the other hand, if the weight of an eliminated item is
redistributed to the items in the lower cluster, then only the distances in this cluster will decrease,
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Fig. 7. Diferent redistributions of weights ater eliminating an item.
as illustrated in Figure 7(b). This will not prevent those in the higher cluster to be considered for
elimination, as their distances to the mean are not afected.
In this section, we propose RBA, which distributes the weight of an eliminated item to the items
in the lower cluster equally. The method is similar to GBA, except that theweighting function used
in Algorithm 1 is replaced by the RWeighting function given in Algorithm 2, where π r and π c are
row and column projection functions, respectively, and the lower function returns the items in the
lower cluster of a group.
ALGORITHM 2: RWeighting (D,W r ,W c , i, j)
Input: A distance table D, row and column weight tablesW r ,W c and indices i and j of the item eliminated
Output: Updated weight tablesW r andW c
1: Dr ← π ri (D), D
c ← πcj (D)
2: for dy ∈ lower (D
r ) do
3: W riy ←W
r
iy +
wri j
|lower (Dr ) |
4: end for
5: for dx ∈ lower (D
c ) do
6: W cx j ←W
c
x j +
wci j
|lower (Dc ) |
7: end for
8: return W r ,W c
Step 1 obtains two groups, Dr and Dc , from the distance table, which are the row and column
that contain the eliminated item di j . Step 2 loops over each item dy in the lower cluster of D
r ,
and its corresponding weight in the row weight table is adjusted in Step 3 by adding
wri j
|lower (Dr ) |
to the current weight, wherewri j is the weight of the eliminated item in the row weight table and
|lower (Dr ) | is the number of items in the lower cluster. That is, the weight of the eliminated item is
divided equally among the items in the lower cluster. The columnweight table is updated similarly
in Steps 5 and 6. Finally, Step 7 returns the two updated weight tables.
Consider the example we used to illustrate GBA again. Applying RBA to the distance table gives
the same result in the irst iteration and icd in T3 is eliminated as it has the greatest distance value
in the group and the group has the greatest vulnerability. However, the weight of icd is distributed
diferently this time. In row C3 in Figure 8(a), the weight is distributed to limbs and injury only,
and blood pressure does not receive any additional weight, because it is in the higher cluster. In
column icd of Figure 8(a), all items receive weight, because they are all in the lower cluster, and
icd is the only item in the higher cluster that has been eliminated. A new weighted distance table
is given in Figure 8(b).
Continuing the process and after 10 iterations, there is no group that has a vulnerability higher
than the threshold, and the method terminates. We obtain Figure 9 as a result. In this particular
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Fig. 8. The first iteration of RBA.
Fig. 9. The 10th iteration of RBA.
Table 1. Dataset Properties
AOL I2B2 GoArticle
Density 0.22 0.28 0.55
Length 23 216 104
Source Format Transaction Text Text
Quality Many T&A Many T&A Few T&A
Domain Multiple Healthcare Multiple
example, RBA has achieved a remarkable accuracy due to its weight redistributionmechanism, and
our experiments show that RBA generally outperforms GBA and the other methods we proposed
previously (Ong and Shao 2014).
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed methods empirically. Wemeasure the efectiveness of our
attacks in terms of recall and precision. That is, the more added items can be eliminated correctly
by a method, the more efective the method.
6.1 Dataset Preparation and Experiment Setup
Our experiments were conducted on the transactions extracted from three real datasets: AOL
(search queries),1 I2B2 (medical texts),2 and GoArticle (general articles).3 Table 1 summarizes their
properties.
—Density is the average ratio of the number of original items to the total number of items in
a generalized item.
—Length is the average number of items in a transaction.
—Source Format indicates the type of data from which we obtain the dataset.
1http://gregsadetsky.com/aol-data/.
2http://i2b2.org.
3http://www.goarticles.com.
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Fig. 10. An example of I2B2 text and extracted transaction.
—Quality indicates if the data contains many typos and abbreviations (T&A).
—Domain indicates if the dataset covers a single or multiple domains.
All these properties can afect the performance of our methods, as we shall see later, and hence
they provide a good testbed for studying ourmethods. In the following, we describe the preparation
of these datasets in detail.
6.1.1 I2B2. I2B2 has 630 text documents containing de-identiied clinical data and patient dis-
charge reports. We choose this dataset because healthcare is one of the most relevant areas for
privacy protection. We take the following steps to transform the text data into transactions:
—The Stanford’s Part-Of-Speech Tagger4 is used to extract nouns and noun phrases (i.e., noun
+ noun, adjective + noun or noun) from a text to form a transaction.
—Some parts of a text, such as headers and footers of a report, are ignored as they are repetitive
and not useful in analytic studies.
—We remove any item that (1) is a stop word; (2) is duplicated including singular and plural
forms; (3) is contained in another item (e.g., removing “history” if we have “long history”
already), because a noun phrase is generally considered to be more meaningful than a noun.
Figure 10(a) shows an example document of the dataset and Figure 10(b) shows the extracted
transaction. The documents in the dataset contain many typographical errors and abbreviations
that can afect the results. We retained abbreviations, because many common abbreviations can
be understood by the Google Search Engine, but we do not attack generalized items that contain
typos. Note that although we do not distinguish singular and plural terms, it does not afect the
semantic measurement when using NGD, because Google automatically searches for both cases.
6.1.2 AOL. The AOL dataset contains about 20M search queries from 650k users. Each record
has user_id, timestamp, one or more search keywords, the url clicked, and the clicked rank.
AOL data are already in a transaction form, but we reformat the data to remove unnecessary
4http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/tagger.shtml.
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Fig. 11. An example of AOL data and extracted transaction.
information. Figure 11(a) shows the data in its original form and Figure 11(b) shows the transac-
tions obtained following these preparation steps:
—We irst divide the dataset into transactions by user sessions. That is, queries posed with
the same user_id (AnonID in Figure 11(a)) are put into one transaction. We remove user_id,
timestamp and clicked url from the dataset. A keyword may be searched multiple times,
and we only include it once.
—We then extract nouns and noun phrases as we did for I2B2. However, when search queries
are short containing one or two terms, it is di cult to process them using the normal part
of speech tags as they do not follow proper grammar. So we consider the whole query as a
single item in such cases. For longer search queries, we use the POS tagger to extract them.
—Similarly to the I2B2 dataset, we also apply the rules to remove stop words or redundant
words.
While I2B2 is about themedical domain only, search queries in theAOL dataset are about various
topics. Therefore, when generalizing them, keywords from diferent domains may be grouped
together. This may make added terms easier to detect, and this dataset will test how our methods
work on this type of data.
6.1.3 GoArticle. The AOL and I2B2 datasets have a similar property: Their generalized items
tend to have a low density. To evaluate our methods on datasets with a higher density, we
constructed the GoArticle dataset, which is collected from GoArticles.com on some speciic topics.
We manually chose articles which share many common keywords, forming relatively dense
transactions.
GoArticle contains free text that is similar to the I2B2 dataset. So the same process is followed
to prepare and extract transactions from free text. Figure 12(a) shows a sample document and
Figure 12(b) shows an extracted transaction.
6.1.4 Experiment Setup. We used COAT (COnstraint-based Anonymization of Transactions)
(Loukides et al. 2011) to anonymize a set of transactions. COAT requires the user to specify the
following inputs:
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 17, No. 4, Article 40. Publication date: September 2017.
Exploiting Contextual Information in Atacking Set-Generalized Transactions 40:15
Fig. 12. An example of GoArticle text and extracted transaction.
Table 2. Characteristics of the Datasets Used in Experiments
Dataset Extracted transaction Generalized items
AOL 758 127
I2B2 643 112
GoArticle 263 45
—Privacy constraints. These specify which items in a given transaction dataset need to be
protected. In our experiments, we randomly select x% items as privacy constraints.
—Protection parameter k . This parameter ensures that any subset of items in a privacy con-
straint appears at least k times in the transactions. In our experiments, we varied k from 2
to 6.
—Utility constraints. They specify what can be used to generalize an item in transactions.
In our experiments, we use two types of utility constraint. One simply uses all the items
as single utility constraint. This may cause signiicant utility losses but ofers better pri-
vacy protection as it creates more “diverse” generalizations. We also use a WordNet based
approach to specifying utility constraints.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the datasets we used in experiments. Extracted transac-
tions are the number of transactions that are constructed from the original data. Generalized items
is the number of generalized items to be attacked. This number is relatively small compared with
the actual number of generalized items in the dataset but is suicient to test our methods.
6.2 Results and Discussion
In this section, we report our experimental results. For comparison, we have also included the
results from our previous methods (Ong and Shao 2014). Random Attack (RA) randomly decides
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Fig. 13. Recall, precision, and F-score vs. k .
if an item is added and serves as a baseline method for comparison. Maximum Distance Attack
(MDA) is a conservative method that eliminates the largest distance from a distance table in attack.
Threshold Based Attack (TBA) eliminates all distances that are above a speciied threshold, so its
efectiveness relies on a good threshold. Weight Based Attack (WBA) is similar to GBA and RBA
in that it also involves weights and weight redistribution, but it treats all distances uniformly. The
reader is referred to Ong and Shao (2014) for details of these methods.
6.2.1 Efect of k . Figure 13 shows the efect of varying k on the recall (how many added items
are identiied), precision (how many identiied items are actually added items), and F-score (com-
bination of recall and precision) of each method.
In terms of datasets, all the methods performed better on AOL, with RBA achieving an F-score
of about 80% for all k values. This is mainly because AOL has a relatively lower density, making
it more likely for an added item to be eliminated. This was manifested by the fact that RA has
achieved a precision of 70% on AOL but with a very low recall. Furthermore, many AOL transac-
tions contain multiple, distinct contexts, and when items from diferent contexts mix during gen-
eralization there is a better chance to identify added items. This can be seen by comparing AOL
to I2B2. I2B2 has a similar density to AOL, but I2B2 items are from the single healthcare domain.
This makes added items more di cult to identify, hence lower F-scores. Finally, with GoArticle,
GBA and RBA achieved relatively low precision, although their F-scores are still superior to those
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Fig. 14. Recall, precision, and F-score vs. density.
of the other methods. This was the result of clustering: Using the largest distance gap to split data
into two groups is not efective in some cases.
On the methods, MDA gave low recall and high precision. This is expected, as MDA only at-
tempts to eliminate one added item, so is likely to achieve high precision, especially when the
density of a dataset is low. Both WBA and TBA can achieve high precision but can only elim-
inate a small number of added items. This is because when the density of a dataset is low, the
average-based threshold will be high. This leaves many added items below the threshold and not
eliminated. GBA and RBA, on the other hand, divide items into comparable groups, focusing on
items that are more likely to be added and using early rounds of eliminations to help elimination
in the later rounds selectively, thereby improving the overall efectiveness.
6.2.2 Efect of Data Density. We also tested our methods with diferent density levels. To set
up the experiment, we selected subsets of documents (transactions) from the GoArticle dataset to
have an average density from 0.1 to 0.7, and the result is shown in Figure 14. We do not include
RA and MDA here as they are not afected by density.
Generally, the precision of the methods decreased when the density increased. This is because
when the density is high, many transactions share the same items and fewer items are needed to
add into a transaction during generalization. On the other hand, all our methods rely on a notion
of average threshold, and when many items in a generalized item are original, the average tends
to be below some original items, resulting in some original items to be eliminated. The recall, on
the other hand, was not afected by the density, with GBA and RBA showing a strong performance
in eliminating a large proportion of added items across all levels of density. This demonstrates the
efectiveness of our clustering-based methods: GBA and RBA out-performed the other methods in
detecting and eliminating added items.
6.2.3 Efect of Utility Constraints. In the previous experiments, we used the most general utility
constraint to anonymize a set of transactions: Any item can be used to form a generalizing set.
This helps test our methods in general, but one could argue that this makes added items potentially
easier to identify, as it is more likely for the generalization process to mix semantically inconsistent
items in a single generalized item.
To test how our methods would deal with more carefully constructed utility constraints, we
carried out an experiment where a dataset is anonymized by more semantically consistent utility
constraints. That is, we only use the items that are semantically related to the item to be protected
to form a generalising set during generalization.We did this experimentwith the GoArticle dataset,
as its multiple contexts and higher density allow us to construct some semantically very consistent
utility constraints.
We used the same setup for the GoArticle dataset as in Figure 13, except that utility constraints
are constructed using the following steps:
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Fig. 15. General vs. semantically consistent tility constraints.
—We extract all the items appeared in the dataset to form the domain I of the dataset. We
include all items so COAT is less likely to suppress an item.
—Given a privacy constraint (i1, i2, . . . , in ), we search all items in I that are semantically
close to i1. To determine the closeness of two items im and in , we use a similarity measure
given by Wu and Palmer (1994) based on the WordNet:
similarity = 2 × depth(im , in )/(depth(im ) + depth(in )),
where depth(im ) and depth(in ) are the distances from the root to items im and in on the
ontology tree and depth(im , in ) is the distance from the root to the lowest common ancestor
of im and in . Two items are deemed to be suiciently related if their similarity score is above
0.5.
—We do the same for other items in the privacy constraint. This results in a utility constraint
that contains only the items that are semantically consistent with the privacy constraint.
Because not all items in the domain will be added into a utility constraint, COAT may need
to suppress some items to satisfy the privacy constraint. However, as our methods do not
consider attacking suppressed items, suppressed items are ignored during attack and are
not included in distance tables.
Figure 15 compares the results of attacking the same dataset anonymized using general utility
constaints and semantically consistent ones. For clarity of presentation, we only show the results
from TBA and RBA here; other methods displayed a similar pattern. We use TBA’ and RBA’ to
denote the results associated with the dataset that are generalized using semantically consistent
utility constraints, and TBA and RBA the general ones. As can be seen, recalls associated with
semantically consistent utility constraints are slightly lower as a result of introducing semantically
more consistent items into transactions, resulting in a distance table with close distances and fewer
items being above the average distance. The precisions are also slightly lower, because some added
items are closely related to the context, causing some original items to be eliminated. However, the
overall results in F-score show that ourmethods are not signiicantly afected by utility constraints,
and hence we believe that the context of transaction can be used to identify added items even
though semantically similar or consistent items are used in generalization.
6.2.4 Eficiency. Figure 16 shows the eiciency of our methods. The performance of our meth-
ods is dependent on the size of distance table, so we evaluate the performance by varying distance
table sizes. We use N r × N r to denote the size of a distance table, where N r is the number of rows
and N c the number of columns. Figure 16 shows the time taken to process a distance table.
It is easy to show that TBA has a complexity of O (N r × N c ) and WBA, GBA, and RBA have
O ((N r × N c )2). This is conirmed in the experiments, as can be seen in Figure 16. It can also be
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Fig. 16. Eficiency.
seen that although GBA and RBA have a similar complexity to WBA, WBA has a better response
time, because RBA and GBA need extra time to cluster items. Note that we have not included the
time for NGD scoring in this experiment as the process is run remotely on Google servers and is
dependent on the Internet speed and external searching algorithms. It is, however, a slow process:
It took more than 24 hours to perform the NGD scoring in our experiments.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have studied if protection for transactions ofered by set-based generalization
is suicient. We have proposed methods to attack anonymized data by exploiting contextual in-
formation available within the released dataset. Our study has identiied a signiicant issue that
has been overlooked by the existing privacy models, and our experiments show that our proposed
methods can eliminate up to 70% of added items with a precision about 80%. As our methods do not
rely on any background knowledge that an adversary may have, the privacy risks that we identify
here are real.
Our work can be extended in a number of directions. First, it is worth investigating a more
powerful and accurate scoring approach for semantic attack. Second, we have concentrated on set-
based generalization of transaction data. The attacking approach has the potential to be applied
to other types of data and privacy models. Finally, it will be useful to study how the conidence of
an elimination may be established, which will allow better elimination heuristics to be developed.
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